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This article considers the controversial issue of the admission of sexual experience 
evidence in sexual offence trials. The discussion begins with an assessment of the 
shortcomings of the current Irish approach to the regulation of the admissibility of 
sexual experience evidence. It is argued that Irish discretionary approach, which 
allows trial judges a wide discretion to introduce such evidence, is not the most 
appropriate method of regulation in this area. The article thus examines English and 
Canadian rules in this area in order to determine which of these two jurisdictions 
differing approaches to the regulation of sexual experience evidence represents the 
most suitable advancement on discretionary regimes such as that which applies in 
Irish law. Having examined the approach of both of these jurisdictions, it is 
concluded that Canadian law epitomises the best practice model for controlling the 
admission of sexual experience evidence in sexual offence trials.  
 
I – Introduction 
  
The admission of sexual experience evidence in sexual offence trials is one of the 
more controversial aspects of sexual offences law. Historically, such evidence was freely 
admissible and was used in order to suggest that the complainant was unchaste and 
therefore likely to have consented or, alternatively that she was unworthy of belief. 
With the rape law reform efforts in the 1980s, most common law jurisdictions sought to 
curb the use of this category of evidence. The goal of these reforms was to make sure 
that such evidence was only admitted where it was logically relevant to the defence case 
and that it would no longer be used by the defence in order to besmirch the 
complainant’s character and unfairly undermine her credibility. The typical model for 
regulation which was adopted at this time was a discretionary one. Under this type of 
regime, the defence must make a formal application to the trial judge in order to admit 
sexual experience evidence. Whether the application is to be granted is then left to the 
discretion of the trial judge.  
  
                                                 
 Lecturer in Law, University of Limerick. The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Shane 
Kilcommins and Dr. Mary Donnelly (both of University College Cork) for helpful advice and commentary 
on earlier versions of this work. However, the views expressed and any errors contained within remain 
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The discretionary approach to the regulation of the admission of sexual 
experience evidence still applies in Irish law. However, recent empirical evidence in 
Ireland has suggested that this model is problematic and does not offer complainants 
optimum protection from unnecessary introduction of such evidence. Having 
encountered similar problems with discretionary schemes, common law jurisdictions 
such as England and Wales and Canada have developed more sophisticated regimes in 
this area. This article assesses these alternative approaches in order to determine which 
represents a modern best practice model for the regulation of the admissibility of sexual 
experience evidence.  
 
 The article will use the current Irish law on the regulation of the admission of 
sexual experience evidence in order to demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
discretionary approach. The alternatives offered by English and Canadian law, 
respectively, will then be explored. It will be seen that these jurisdictions have adopted 
two quite different approaches. In English law, a strict rule-bound scheme dictates that 
sexual experience evidence may only be admitted if it fits within certain clearly defined 
categories or gateways. Contrarily, the Canadian legislature has opted to allow trial 
judges to retain their discretion but guided it in order to make sure that applications for 
admission are not made lightly. This article will argue that the Canadian structured 
discretion approach offers the optimum advancement on discretionary regimes such as 
that which continues to operate in Irish law. 
 
 
II – The Irish Discretionary Model: An Inadequate Filter for the Unwarranted 
Admission of Sexual Experience Evidence 
 
 The current Irish rules regulating the admissibility of sexual experience 
evidence in sexual offence trials may be found in section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) 
Act 1981.1 Section 3 provides that at a trial for a sexual assault offence,2 the defence may 
                                                 
1 As amended by the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990, s. 13. 
2 A “sexual assault” offence means “a rape offence” and any of the following, namely, aggravated sexual 
assault, attempted aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, aiding, abetting, 
counselling and procuring aggravated sexual assault, attempted aggravated sexual assault or attempted 
sexual assault, incitement to aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault and conspiracy to commit any of 
the foregoing offences. A “rape offence” means any of the following, namely, rape, attempted rape, 
burglary with intent to commit rape, aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring rape, attempted rape or 
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not pose questions or introduce evidence regarding the sexual experience (other than 
that to which the charge relates) of the complainant3 without leave from the trial judge.  
 
 The decision of People (D.P.P.) v. G.K.4 suggests that the Irish judiciary have 
taken the enactment of section 3 seriously and that trial judges should be very slow to 
permit sexual experience evidence to be adduced. The Court of Criminal Appeal held 
that, having regard to the severely restrictive terminology of section 3, in general, a 
decision to refuse to allow cross-examination as to sexual experience may more readily 
be justified in most cases than the converse.5  The Court also stated that where a form of 
questioning is allowed, it should be confined only to what is strictly necessary and 
should never be utilised as a form of character assassination of a complainant.6 However, 
whilst the judiciary have accepted the discretion to admit sexual experience evidence 
should be used sparingly, available empirical evidence suggests that this attitude has not 
translated into a reduction in the use of such evidence in Irish sexual offence trials.  
 
 Empirical data on the operation of section 3 can be found in the study of thirty-
five trial transcripts conducted for the attrition study Rape & Justice in Ireland which 
was published in 2009.7 In the cases studied for the purposes of that research, 
applications for the introduction of sexual experience evidence were made in only seven 
cases and such evidence was not referred to at all in nineteen cases.8 This suggests that 
the introduction of the section has curbed the use of this evidence to some extent. 
However, upon closer inspection, some aspects of the research findings indicate that 
                                                                                                                                                 
burglary with intent to commit rape, and incitement to commit rape, and rape under section 4, attempted 
rape under section 4, aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring rape under section 4 or attempted rape 
under section 4 and incitement to rape under section 4: Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, s. 1 (as amended by 
the Criminal Law (Rape)(Amendment) Act 1990, s. 12).  
3 It is noteworthy that “sexual experience” in this context refers to sexual experience with the defendant 
and/or with third parties.  
4 [2007] 2 I.R. 92. 
5 Ibid. at 103. 
6 Ibid. at 103-104.  
7 The primary aim of this project was to obtain information about the causes of attrition in rape cases in 
Ireland by reviewing materials from different points of the criminal justice system. There were three 
strands to the project which sought to obtain information about the three primary attrition points in the 
criminal justice system, that is: (1) the decision by victims whether to make a formal report to the gardaí; 
(2) the decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions whether to initiate a prosecution; and (3) the trial 
process: C. Hanly et al, Rape & Justice in Ireland: A National Study of Survivor, Prosecutor and Court Responses 
to Rape (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2009). 
8 Ibid. at 355. 
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section 3 is not as effective as it could be. Six of the seven applications for the 
introduction of sexual experience evidence were successful.9 This indicates that such 
applications have a high success rate and are granted without much difficulty. Research 
by Bacik et al has also signalled that section 3 might not be acting as an adequate filter 
for the admission of sexual experience evidence.10  Bacik et al analysed D.P.P. files for 40 
rape11 trials which came before the Central Criminal Court in the period from 2003 to 
2009. They found that 70% of section 3 applications were granted. This finding, 
together with the findings from Hanly et al, seems to demonstrate that once section 3 
applications are made, they are likely to be successful. Indeed, as O’Malley has 
commented, the dearth of appellate judgments in this area indicates that defence counsel 
are not experiencing any great difficulty in getting leave for the admission of sexual 
experience evidence when they seek it.12 It therefore seems that the section 3 
discretionary regime is not the optimum method of restricting the unwarranted 
introduction of sexual experience evidence. 
 
 In seeking to ameliorate the permissive attitude towards the admission of sexual 
experience evidence which the discretionary model has allowed to develop amongst the 
Irish judiciary, two options for reform present themselves. The first rule-bound 
approach is to be found in English law. Under this scheme, sexual experience evidence 
may only be introduced if it comes within one of a select number of categories of 
admissibility. The second, more flexible, option can be seen in the Canadian Criminal 
Code. This structured discretion regime allows trial judges to retain their discretion to 
admit sexual experience evidence but directs trial judges on how to exercise this 
discretion. This guidance encourages a careful approach to assessments of relevance, 
thereby ensuring that sexual experience evidence is only introduced where it is logically 
                                                 
9 Ibid. at 342. 
10 The results of this research have yet to be published. The findings outlined here are taken from a 
conference presentation given by Ivana Bacik at the “Rape Law- Victims on Trial?” Conference in Dublin 
Castle on 16 January 2010: I. Bacik, et al, “Separate Legal Representation in Rape Trials” available at: 
<http://www.ivanabacik.com/archives/371> (date accessed: 29 August 2013).  
11 For the purposes of the study, “rape” is defined as including rape under section 4 of the Criminal Law 
(Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990, that is, a sexual assault that includes penetration (however slight) of (a) the 
anus or mouth by the penis or (b) the vagina by any object held or manipulated by another person.  
12 T.  O’Malley, Sexual Offences: Law, Policy & Punishment (Dublin: Roundhall, 1996) at 242. 
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relevant to the defence case. The following sections will assess both of these models in 
order to determine which one represents best practice in this area.  
 
III – The English Rule-Bound Model: An Unduly Restrictive Approach?  
 
 In English law, the regulation of the rules regulating the admissibility of sexual 
experience evidence can be found in section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 (Y.J.C.E.A. 1999). Prior to the introduction of this provision, the English rules 
on this issue resembled current Irish law, that is, such evidence could only be admitted 
with the leave of trial judges who retained discretion to admit or exclude sexual 
experience evidence. Under section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 (1976 
Act), on an application by the defence, the trial judge could admit evidence of sexual 
experience of the complainant with third parties if s/he was of the view that it would be 
unfair to exclude it.13 Evidence of sexual experience which involved the complainant and 
defendant was generally admissible, having been left outside the provisions of the 1976 
Act.14 Due to sustained criticism of the 1976 Act,15 the English legislature decided to 
move away from the discretionary approach which had existed under the old law and to 
replace it with a rule-bound scheme. As stated above, this approach prohibits the 
introduction of sexual experience evidence unless it falls within one of the exceptions 
                                                 
13 Section 2(1) provides: “[i]f at a trial any person is for the time being charged with a rape offence to  
which he pleads not guilty, then, except with leave of the judge, no evidence and no question in cross-
examination shall be adduced or asked at trial, about any sexual experience of a complainant with a 
person other than the defendant.”  The following subsection provides:  
 
[t]he judge shall not give leave in pursuance of the preceding subsection for any evidence or 
question except on an application made to him in the absence of the jury by or on behalf of a 
defendant; and on such an application the judge shall give leave if and only if he is satisfied that it 
would be unfair to the defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the question to 
be asked. 
 
14 N. Kibble, “The Relevance and Admissibility of Prior Sexual History with the Defendant in Sexual 
Offence Cases” (2001) 32 Cambrian Law Review 27 at 27 [hereinafter Kibble “Prior Sexual History”]. 
15 N. Kibble, “The Sexual History Provisions: Charting a Course Between Inflexible Legislative Rules and 
Wholly Untrammelled Judicial Discretion” [2000] Criminal Law Review 274 at 275 [hereinafter Kibble, 
“The Sexual History Provisions”]. Readers are directed to the following examples of commentary 
criticising the 1976 Act: Z. Adler, “The Relevance of Sexual History in Rape: Problems of Subjective 
Interpretation” [1985] Criminal Law Review 769; J. Temkin, “Regulating Sexual History Evidence- The 
Limits of Discretionary Legislation” (1984) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 3; J. 
Temkin, “Sexual History Evidence: The Ravishment of Section 2” [1993] Criminal Law Review 3; V. 
Baird, “Changes to Section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 1976” (1999) 39 Med. Sci. Law 198 [hereinafter 
Baird]; A. McColgan, “Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual History Evidence”  (1996) 16 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 275. 
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which are enumerated in the legislation. The statutory exceptions are highly specific, 
reflecting legislative efforts to anticipate precisely those circumstances in which sexual 
conduct evidence will be critical to the presentation of a defence.16 The precise 
admission criteria which are set out in section 41 of the Y.C.J.E.A. 1999 are detailed 
below. 
 
A. The Gateways for the Admission of Sexual Behaviour Evidence under Section 
41 
 
 Section 41 of the Y.J.C.E.A. 1999 provides that at the trial of a sexual offence,17 
no evidence may be adduced and no question asked in cross-examination by or on behalf 
of any defendant about any sexual behaviour18 of the complainant, except with leave of 
the trial judge. This leave may only be granted if the evidence of sexual behaviour 
comes within one of the four specific gateways for admissibility that are provided for in 
sections 41(3) and 41(5), respectively. Section 41(3) sets out three grounds upon which 
sexual behaviour may be admitted and section 41(5) provides for the admission of sexual 
behaviour evidence in order to rebut an inference which has been made by the 
prosecution. In order to contextualise the restrictive approach to sexual experience 
evidence which is advocated by section 41, it is necessary to briefly outline the limits of 
each of these admissibility gateways.  
 
 Section 41(3)(a) provides that evidence of sexual behaviour may be admitted 
where the evidence is related to a relevant issue19 in the case, other than an issue of 
                                                 
16 H. Galvin, “Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade” 
(1986) Minnesota Law Review 763 at 773 [hereinafter Galvin]. 
17 “Sexual offence” includes “any offence under Part 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003”: Y.J.C.E.A. 1999, s. 
62(1) (as amended by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, schedule 6, para. 41). Therefore, it includes rape, assault 
by penetration, sexual assault, causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent. 
18 “Sexual behaviour” is not defined in the Act. Section 41(2) does, however, state that it includes sexual 
experience. The Explanatory Notes on the Act also provide that sexual behaviour would include 
“secondary evidence of sexual behaviour such as abortions”: Explanatory Notes: The Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (London: The Stationery Office, 1999) at para. 145. It is also noteworthy that 
evidence which is sought to be adduced must relate to a specific instance (or specific instances) of alleged 
sexual behaviour on the part of the complainant: s. 41(6). Thus, evidence of general sexual reputation is 
not admissible.  
19 All of the gateways in s. 41(3)(a) contain a common requirement that the evidence of sexual behaviour  
which is sought to be admitted must be “related to a relevant issue in the case.” Evidence of sexual 
behaviour shall not be regarded as relevant to an issue in the case where the purpose or main purpose for 
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consent. Thus, it permits evidence of sexual behaviour to be introduced in relation to 
any matter raised at trial other than the complainant’s consent. In R. v. A. (No. 2),20 
Lord Hope identified the following situations where sexual behaviour evidence might be 
admissible under this gateway:21  
 
- where the defendant claims to have had an honest belief in consent;22  
- where it is alleged that the complainant was biased against the defendant or had 
a motive to fabricate evidence;23  
- where there is an alternative explanation for the physical conditions on which 
the prosecution relies to establish that intercourse took place (e.g. bruising or 
other physical marks);  
- especially in the case of young complainants, in order to argue that the details of 
their account must have come from some other sexual activity before or after the 
event which provide an explanation for their knowledge of that activity.24  
 
 The second gateway (section 41(3)(b)) allows for admissibility of sexual 
experience evidence where it is related to a relevant issue in the case and: “…it is an 
issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the evidence or 
question relates is alleged to have taken place at or about the same time as the event 
which is the subject matter of the charge against the defendant.”  This exception would 
permit evidence of sexual experience where consent is an issue at trial and the relevant 
evidence relates to an incidence of sexual activity which occurred at or about the same 
time as the alleged incident of non-consensual sexual activity.25  
                                                                                                                                                 
which it would be adduced is to establish or elicit material for impugning the credibility of the 
complainant as a witness: Y.J.C.E.A. 1999, s. 41(6).  
20 [2002] 1 A.C. 45 [hereinafter R. v. A (No. 2)].  
21 Ibid. at 78. 
22 If a belief in consent is to be in issue for the purpose of s. 41(3)(a), the defence must be clearly viable on 
the facts: ibid. at 64. See also: R. v. Winter [2008] E.W.C.A. Crim. 3.   
23 The courts have made clear that sexual experience evidence will not be admitted on this ground lightly. 
There must be a clear connection between the sexual experience evidence in question and the motive to 
lie: R. v. Mokrecovas [2001] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1644. 
24 See R. v. M.F. [2005] E.W.C.A. Crim. 3376. 
25 According to the Explanatory Notes to the Y.J.C.E.A. 1999 the phrase “at or about the same time” can 
be interpreted to mean not more than twenty-four hours before or after the alleged event:  Explanatory 
Notes: The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (London: The Stationery Office, 1999) at para. 148.  
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 The third gateway (section 41(3)(c)) permits evidence of sexual behaviour to be 
admitted where it is related to a relevant issue in the case which is an issue of consent 
and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the evidence relates is alleged to 
have been, in any respect so similar: 
 
(i) to any sexual behaviour of the complainant (which according to evidence 
adduced or to be adduced by or on behalf of the defendant) took place as 
part of the event which is the subject matter of the charge against the 
defendant, or 
(ii) to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to 
such evidence) took place at or about the same time as that event, 
that the similarity cannot be reasonably explained as a coincidence. 
 
This gateway allows for the admissibility of evidence of sexual behaviour which is 
apparently similar to the alleged incident of non-consensual sexual activity. The 
justification for admissibility here would seemingly be that the complainant consented 
to sex in similar circumstances on a previous occasion and is thus likely to have 
consented on this occasion.  
 
The final gateway which permits the admission of sexual experience evidence is 
section 41(5) (the rebuttal gateway). This allows for evidence of sexual behaviour to be 
admitted in order to allow the defence to rebut prosecution evidence about any sexual 
behaviour of the complainant. The evidence to be adduced or the question to be asked by 
or on behalf of the defendant must relate to the prosecution evidence and must go no 
further than is necessary to rebut or explain it.26 For example, if the prosecution has 
stated that the complainant was a virgin prior to the alleged incident (and thus unlikely 
to have consented) and the defence have evidence that this was not the case, the defence 
may be permitted to adduce this evidence to the extent necessary to rebut the 
prosecution’s assertion of the complainant’s virginity.27  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
The courts have taken a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the phrase: R. v. A. (No. 2), supra note 
20. 
26 I. Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at 629. 
27 Similarly, the defence might be permitted to adduce rebuttal evidence of sexual behaviour where the 
prosecution had suggested that the complainant was deeply religious and consequently believed that sex 
before marriage was wrong. 
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 Once the defence has chosen a suitable gateway upon which to rely, it is 
necessary to satisfy one additional criterion in order to qualify for admission. As well as 
fitting within one of the gateways, the evidence must still be excluded unless refusing 
leave to allow evidence or questioning in relation to it might have the result of 
rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury on any relevant issue in the case.28 However, 
as Keane argues, this hurdle is not particularly high because the court need only be 
satisfied that a refusal of leave might have the consequence specified, not that such a 
consequence is probable or even likely.29 Consequently, once the defence has 
demonstrated to the trial judge that the sexual behaviour evidence in question satisfies 
the criteria for admissibility under one of the four gateways, it should be relatively 
straightforward to convince him/her that exclusion of the information might render a 
jury’s conclusion on a relevant issue unsafe. 
 
B. Assessing Section 41: Are Strict Rules Preferable to Judicial Discretion? 
 
 At first glance, the tightly defined gateways system provided by rule-bound 
schemes like section 41 appear to offer an attractive and logical alternative to 
discretionary schemes such as that which formerly prevailed in English law and which 
currently exists in Ireland. The primary argument in favour of a strict rule-bound 
approach is that this is the only way of ensuring tighter regulation of the admissibility 
of sexual experience evidence. As the empirical research on Irish sexual offence trials 
has shown, unless judicial discretion is curtailed, judges have a propensity to make 
decisions about sexual experience evidence in the same way in which they always have, 
thereby stultifying any possibility of a more exclusionary approach to this evidence.30 
                                                 
28 Y.J.C.E.A. 1999, s. 41(2)(b). N. Kibble, “Judicial Perspectives on the Operation of Section 41 and the 
Relevance and Admissibility of Prior Sexual History Evidence: Four Scenarios” [2005] Criminal Law 
Review 190 at 191 [hereinafter Kibble, “Judicial Perspectives”]. 
29 A. Keane et al, The Modern Law of Evidence, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 204.  
30 Temkin suggests that it was “odd indeed” that under the discretionary scheme in section 2 of the 1976 
Act, “the judges, the very people who were responsible for the widespread admission of sexual history 
evidence in the first place, were left with the ‘discretion’ whether to admit it or not”: J. Temkin, “Sexual 
History Evidence: Beware the Backlash” [2003] Criminal Law Review 217 at 218. A similar point is made 
by Easton who notes that in retrospect, it was unwise for the decision on sexual experience evidence to 
rest on judicial assessments of unfairness when judge’s attitudes in the past were part of the problem: S. 
Easton, “The Use of Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials” in M. Childs & L. Ellison, Feminist 
Perspectives on Evidence (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2000) 187 [hereinafter Easton]. Lees points 
to her own trial observations in order to observe that, prior to the introduction of the Y.J.C.E.A. 1999, 
judges were continuing to routinely allow sexual experience evidence to be adduced at trial:  S. Lees, 
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Since the judges will not make a change themselves, change should be imposed upon 
them by the legislature. This desire to curb judicial discretion in order to achieve 
change is evident in the introduction of section 41. The issue of judicial discretion was 
not overtly discussed in Speaking Up for Justice (the Report which considered reform in 
this area prior to the introduction of section 41) or in the parliamentary debates on the 
Y.J.C.E.A. 1999.31 Nevertheless, there is a sense that there was dissatisfaction with the 
approach to sexual experience evidence which was permitted by the discretionary 
regime in the 1976 Act. Drawing on available statistics, it was concluded in Speaking Up 
for Justice that there was “overwhelming evidence” that the prevailing practice in the 
courts was “unsatisfactory” and that section 2 of the 1976 Act was not achieving its 
purpose (i.e. curtailing the use of sexual experience evidence).32 Thus, the introduction 
of a rule-bound scheme was no doubt seen as a viable method of forcing trial judges to 
change their habits. However, whilst in theory rule-bound schemes seem to hold the 
prospect of significant improvements, in practice such schemes give rise to a number of 
difficulties which greatly undermine their effectiveness.  
 
 Perhaps one of the most significant problems with rule-bound schemes such as 
section 41 is the potential to infringe defendants’ rights. Whilst it is certainly true that 
the admissibility of sexual experience evidence needs to be tightly regulated, it must 
also be acknowledged that prior sexual experiences of the complainant will often be 
relevant to the defence case. For example, the defendant may wish to introduce evidence 
of his own previous consensual sexual activity with the complainant in order to 
establish a pattern of behaviour which suggests that the complainant might have 
consented to the sexual activity which forms the basis of the charge. Alternatively, he 
may want to introduce evidence of previous sexual experience with himself or with 
others to, for example, establish a mistaken belief in consent or a bias or motive to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial, 2nd ed. (London: The Women’s Press Ltd, 2002) at xxi [hereinafter 
Lees]. Lees suggested that there was evidence that judges were not impartial observers and used their 
discretion in different ways: ibid. at 151. 
31 N. Kibble, “Judicial Discretion and the Admissibility of Prior Sexual History Evidence under Section 41 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: Sometimes Sticking to Your Guns Means Shooting 
Yourself in the Foot” [2005] Criminal Law Review 263 at 263 [hereinafter Kibble, “Judicial Discretion”]. 
32 Home Office, Speaking Up for Justice: Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Treatment of 
Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System, (London: Home Office, 1998) at para. 9.64. 
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fabricate evidence.33 If rule-bound schemes are drafted so restrictively that this 
potentially relevant evidence is excluded, then there is a clear conflict with the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Consequently, such schemes have the potential to fall 
foul of fair trial guarantees in human rights instruments such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (E.C.H.R.).34 Indeed, this is precisely what happened in 
the wake of the introduction of section 41, which was challenged at the Central Criminal 
Court the day after it came into force.35 The outcome of this challenge was the decision 
of the House of Lords (as it then was) in R. v. A. (No. 2).36  
 
 The defendant in this case was charged with rape. He sought to have evidence of 
an alleged sexual relationship with the complainant admitted as evidence.37 It was 
argued that this evidence supported his contention that the complainant had consented 
to sex with him. However, section 41 did not permit the admission of sexual behaviour 
evidence solely on this basis and the defendant could not bring his evidence within any 
of the gateways in the section. The House of Lords had to consider whether the failure 
to allow for the admission of the evidence was a breach of the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial in Article 6 of the E.C.H.R., which was incorporated into English law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998.38 It was held that if this type of evidence had to be excluded as a 
result of section 41, this would generate problems regarding the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial. However, the House of Lords decided not to hold that section 41 was 
incompatible with the E.C.H.R.39 Instead, Lord Steyn held that it was possible to read 
                                                 
33 See Kibble, “Prior Sexual History”, supra note 15 at 31. 
34 Article 6(2) of the E.C.H.R. provides that “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.” Defendants are entitled to similar rights in Ireland. Article 
6 is equally applicable in an Irish context, where defendants’ rights are also enshrined in Article 38.1 of 
the Irish Constitution. The Irish constitutional provisions are discussed more fully in Part IV below.  
35 The trial judge discharged the jury and gave leave to appeal “with enthusiasm” on the grounds that the 
defendant was being denied a fair trial contrary to his rights under Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights: See Lees, supra note 30 at xxvii.  
36 R v. A. (No. 2), supra note 20. 
37 The defendant claimed that he had had consensual sexual intercourse with the complainant a number of 
times in the three weeks prior to the alleged rape, the last instance of sexual intercourse occurring 
approximately one week before the alleged rape. 
38 Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that English legislation “must be read and given 
effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention Rights.” Thus, when applying a statute, the 
English courts must interpret it in a manner which is compatible with the E.C.H.R. 
39 Section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that “if the court is satisfied that the provision is 
incompatible with a Convention Right it may make a declaration of incompatibility.” 
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section 41, and in particular section 41(3)(c) (the similarity exception40), as being subject 
to the implied provision that evidence or questioning which is required to ensure a fair 
trial under Article 6 should not be treated as inadmissible.41  The Law Lords restored an 
element of discretion to trial judges with regard to the admissibility of sexual 
experience evidence by providing that under section 41(3)(c): 
 
… construed where necessary by applying the interpretative obligation under 
section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and due regard always being paid to 
the importance of seeking to protect the complainant from indignity and from 
humiliating questions, the test of admissibility is whether the evidence (and 
questioning in relation to it) is nevertheless so relevant to the issue of consent 
that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of the trial under Article 6 of the 
Convention. If this test is satisfied the evidence should not be excluded.42 
 
As a result of this decision, where the defence is consent, the trial judge will have 
discretion whether to admit evidence of previous sexual activity between the defendant 
and the complainant if a failure to admit such evidence would breach the fair trial rights 
of the defendant.  
 
 The decision in R. v. A. (No. 2) demonstrates that any attempt to curtail a 
defendant’s access to relevant sexual experience evidence raises serious implications for 
fair trial rights. This may result in the whole regime being struck down as a breach of 
due process guarantees. Admittedly, the House of Lords decided not to declare the 
entire section incompatible with the E.C.H.R., preferring to interpret it in a manner 
which complied with defendants’ rights. This avoided the creation of a new legislative 
scheme. However, the need to protect the rights of defendants still resulted in an 
alteration of the regime which was not intended by the legislature. This reinforces the 
unassailable nature of defendants’ rights. They cannot be legislated out of existence. 
Since the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to defend himself, he must be 
permitted to raise any evidence which is relevant to that defence. Any legislative 
                                                 
40 That is, the exception which permits sexual experience evidence to be admitted where the 
complainant’s previous sexual behaviour was so similar to her behaviour at the time of the alleged 
incident that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
41 R v. A. (No. 2), supra note 20 at 68. Steyn L. stated that it was “realistic to proceed on the basis that the 
legislature would not, if alerted to the problem, have wished to deny the right to an accused to put 
forward a full and complete defence by advancing truly probative material.” Ibid. 
42 Ibid. at 69. 
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formula which seeks to circumvent this right is unlikely to withstand human rights 
challenges.  
 
 The second problem with rule-bound schemes is that seeking to suppress judicial 
discretion is a formidable task and is likely to be resisted by trial judges. This is evident 
from the decision of R. v. A. (No. 2). In order to maintain their ability to do justice for 
defendants, the judiciary moved to restore their discretion to admit sexual experience 
evidence where this was necessary to protect defendants’ rights. Indeed, even without 
formal restoration of discretion such as that which occurred in R. v. A. (No. 2), it is likely 
that judges will seek to maintain their discretion on an informal basis and exercise it 
where they believe that this is necessary. Research with judges conducted by Kibble in 
the wake of the introduction of section 41 demonstrates the potential for this to 
happen.43 Many of the judges commented that without the decision in R. v. A. (No. 2), 
section 41 would not be workable. The judges also intimated that in their determination 
to avoid the injustice which may be caused by the legislative provision, they would feel 
obliged to respond, presumably by refusing to apply the strict letter of the provision.44 
Similar research conducted by Temkin and Krahé revealed analogous results. Despite 
section 41, six of seventeen judges interviewed in Temkin and Krahé’s study expressed 
themselves to be unprepared to forego their discretion in relation to sexual experience 
evidence.45 Consequently, it is clear that a judge faced with a provision of a rule-bound 
scheme which is likely to cause injustice is liable to circumvent the provision and restore 
his/her discretion to admit sexual experience evidence in order to provide a more 
favourable outcome.  
 
                                                 
43 Kibble conducted interviews with seventy-eight judges in 2003: See Kibble, “Judicial Perspectives”, 
supra note 28 at 263. 
44 This sentiment is well-articulated by the following statement from one judge in Kibble’s study: 
 
I don’t think it’s a question of judges really bending the law. But I’d be prepared to bend one or 
two things, on timing whether it’s contemporaneous, if it’s a few days rather than 24 hours and 
that sort of thing. But it’s a question of fairness at the end of the day, You’ve got to consider the 
complainant of course. Is it fair to the complainant and is it fair to the defendant? It’s a balancing 
exercise. You do what you think is right. 
 
Ibid. at 264. 
45 Indeed, the judges listed a number of techniques which they would use in order to neutralise the effects 
of section 41: J. Temkin, & B. Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005) at 148-150 [hereinafter Temkin & Krahé]. 
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 Aside from a desire to protect defendants’ rights, another reason why trial 
judges will be jealous to protect their discretion is the fact that “no legislature has the 
prescience to foresee every eventuality … .”46 Thus, it is likely that cases will come 
before the court that the legislation has not accounted for. Given the diverse range of 
fact scenarios which come before the courts in sexual offence cases, it is highly unlikely 
that any legislative scheme could be drafted in such a way as to cover every possible fact 
pattern which could arise in relation to the admission of sexual experience evidence.47 
Should an unforeseen circumstance arise, it is likely that the trial judge will have to use 
his/her discretion and make an ad hoc decision regarding the admissibility of sexual 
experience evidence.  
 
 As a result, it is clear that, due to the need to protect defendants’ rights and the 
impossibility of gateway systems catering for every eventuality, judicial discretion is 
unlikely to be quelled. It is very probable that the judiciary will resurrect its discretion 
either formally, as R. v. A. (No. 2) demonstrates, or on an informal ad hoc basis where 
trial judges feel it is necessary to admit sexual experience evidence in order to do justice 
in an individual case or where the legislation does not provide for the fact scenario 
which is before the court.  
 
 The final problem with rule-bound schemes such as section 41 is their complex 
nature. This intricacy is a direct result of attempts to avoid the two problems which 
have already been outlined. The desire to protect defendants’ rights contributes to 
complexity because legislators must seek to restrict the use of sexual experience 
evidence as far as possible without contravening due process guarantees. This can result 
in convoluted compromises such as the gateway system in section 41. Attempts to curb 
judicial discretion also lead to complication because legislation must seek to provide for 
every fact pattern which may arise in a sexual offence case in order to avoid trial judges 
                                                 
46 See Baird, supra note 15 at 204.  
47 Galvin argues that the underlying flaw in rule-bound schemes is that it is almost impossible to 
anticipate the myriad of factual contexts in which sexual conduct evidence may be highly relevant to a 
legitimate defence theory: See Galvin, supra note 16 at 774. Similarly, Roberts and Zuckerman comment 
that probative value is too mercurial to be captured by inflexible evidentiary categories and too 
unpredictable to be defined in advance by legislation: P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 451. 
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resurrecting their discretion when unusual fact patterns present themselves.48 This 
effort also contributes to the creation of highly detailed and complicated statutes which 
may lead to problems of interpretation. The wording of the gateways in section 41 is 
testament to this. The scheme is difficult to explain, let alone apply in practice. 
Convoluted provisions such as section 41 create confusion which may result in the 
statute being misunderstood49 and consequently inadvertently ignored by judges and 
lawyers. This may serve to minimise the practical benefits of the legislation. 
  
From the foregoing it is clear that the notional promise of rule-bound schemes 
does not always translate into workable legal schemes. Although such systems provide 
an element of clarity for defendants and complainants, they also have the potential to 
exclude relevant evidence and thereby encroach upon defendants’ rights. If this occurs, 
the schemes must be altered by the courts. It is also clear that judicial discretion is very 
difficult to stifle and is likely to resurrect itself in some shape or form. Finally, the 
complexity surrounding rule-bound schemes may lead to them being inadvertently 
flouted, again frustrating the intent of the legislature. All of these problems have arisen 
in England since the enactment of section 41. Thus, it seems that rule-bound schemes 
are not the most suitable replacement for judicial discretion. It seems that an 
intermediate approach between these two types of regime may represent the most 
appropriate model for regulating the admissibility of sexual experience evidence. The 
Canadian structured discretion model offers one such approach.  
 
IV – The Canadian Structured Discretion Model: A Suitable Intermediate 
Approach between Rule-Bound and Discretionary Schemes  
 
 The Canadian rules relating to the admission of sexual experience evidence in 
sexual offence trials is to be found in section 276 of the Canadian Criminal Code. The 
current formulation of section 276 was enacted after a previous rule-bound incarnation 
was found to contravene defendants’ rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
                                                 
48 Galvin views this as the fundamental shortcoming with schemes such as this, making reference to “the 
near impossibility of predicting the myriad of factual contexts in which sexual conduct evidence might be 
relevant to a legitimate defence theory.” See Galvin, ibid. at 865. 
49 Research with barristers and judges which was conducted by Temkin and Krahé did reveal that there 
was a certain lack of understanding surrounding s. 41: See Temkin & Krahé, supra note 45 at 146. 
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Freedoms. The original section 276 was introduced in 1982 and provided for a blanket 
prohibition on the introduction of sexual experience evidence which was subject to just 
three exceptions. In R. v. Seaboyer50 it was held that the provision infringed principles of 
fundamental justice and the right to a fair trial guaranteed by sections 7 and 11(d) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, respectively, because it precluded the court 
from considering relevant evidence.51 Thus, care was taken when drafting the current 
formulation of section 276 in order to ensure that it struck the correct balance between 
the rights of complainants and defendants. The attention paid to protecting the rights of 
defendants in light of the Canadian human rights provisions is important in light of the 
similar mandate imposed in an Irish context by the Constitution. Indeed, one of the 
primary concerns with the rule-bound scheme in the Y.J.C.E.A. 1999 from an Irish 
perspective is its likelihood to fall foul of the due process guarantees in Article 38.1 
which provides that “[n]o person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due 
course of law.” This Article has been interpreted as providing for the right of a 
defendant to receive a fair trial which encompasses the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven to be guilty52 and the right to cross-examine witnesses,53 amongst others. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 permitted the English Law Lords in R. v. A. (No. 2) to 
interpret section 41 so as to make it compatible with the due process guarantees in the 
E.C.H.R. The Irish courts would not be similarly capable of “reading down” an 
equivalent provision with the result that the only option would be to strike the 
provision down as unconstitutional. Consequently, given the strength of defendants’ 
rights in this jurisdiction, the structured discretion regime offers a far more viable 
option than section 41 of the Y.J.C.E.A. 1999. 
 
The Canadian scheme is also a better alternative to the rule-bound scheme in an 
Irish context because of the protection it affords to judicial discretion. The separation of 
                                                 
50 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 [hereinafter Seaboyer]. 
51 See Easton, supra note 30 at 180. For commentary on Seaboyer and discussion on the rape shield rules 
which that decision struck down see: M.A. Wagner, “Canadian Rape Shield Statutes” (1992-1993) 16 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 637; M.D. Smith, “Language, Law and Social 
Power: Seaboyer, Gayme v R and a Critical Theory of Ideology” (1993) 51 University of Toronto Faculty of 
Law Review 118; M. Shaffer, “Seaboyer v R: Case Comment” (1992) 5 Canadian Journal of Women & the 
Law 202.  
52 O’Leary v. A.G. [1993] 1 I.R. 102. 
53 State (Healy) v. Donoghue [1976] I.R. 325. 
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powers is a sacrosanct principle in Irish law. Article 34.1 of the Constitution provides 
that justice must be administered in the courts.54 One of the consequences of this 
provision is that “the other organs of government (legislature and executive) may not 
trespass upon the judicial process … .”55 Casey notes that “Re Haughey established that 
the administration of justice in criminal trials embraced trial conviction and sentence. 
Save for entry of a nolle prosequi, no executive intervention in this process, once begun, is 
permissible.”56 Thus, a rule-bound scheme such as section 41 may be seen as legislative 
interference with judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence and therefore be 
deemed unconstitutional. Unlike the English provisions, however, the prevailing 
version of section 276 has sought to restore judicial discretion, whilst as the same time 
guiding it so that sexual experience evidence is only admitted where it is legitimately 
relevant to the defence case. The section opens with a clear statement of the purposes 
for which sexual experience evidence must never be admitted. The criteria for 
admissibility which trial judges must adhere to when exercising their discretion are 
then outlined. Given the protection afforded to judicial independence and discretion in 
the Irish constitutional jurisprudence, this deference to judicial discretion is likely to be 
more acceptable in an Irish context than the rigidity of a rule bound scheme.  
 
A. Forbidden Reasoning and the Section 276 Regime: Countering the “Twin 
Myths”57 
 
 Section 276 begins with an absolute prohibition on what are regarded as the 
illegitimate uses of sexual experience evidence.58 Section 276(1) provides that: 
 
…evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with 
the accused or with any other person,59 is not admissible to support an inference 
that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant: 
                                                 
54 Article 34.1 provides that: “[j]ustice shall be administered in courts established by law by judges 
appointed in the manner provided by this Constitution, and, save in such special and limited cases as may 
be prescribed by law, shall be administered in public.” 
55 D. Gwynn Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland, 2nd ed.  (Dublin: Round Hall, 1990) at 36. 
56 J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, 3rd ed. (Dublin: Round Hall, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 249. 
57 See infra note 60. 
58 See Kibble, “Judicial Discretion”, supra note 31 at 267. 
59 It is notable that s. 276 encompasses sexual experience evidence with both third parties and the 
defendant. This marked a break with the earlier provision and attracted some critical comment: See A. 
Gold, “Flawed, Fallacious but Feminist: When One Out of Three is Enough” (1993) 42 University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 381; R.J. Delisle, “The New Rape Shield Law and the Charter” (1993) 42 
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(a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the 
subject-matter of the charge; or 
(b) is less worthy of belief. 
 
This opening statement is designed to counter the “twin myths”60 which the defence 
might rely upon when seeking to introduce sexual experience evidence. The first myth 
which this provision is designed to counter relates to consent and operates at two levels. 
At a general level, it suggests that a woman who is sexually experienced is more likely 
to consent to sexual activity. On a more specific (and slightly more realistic) level, it 
suggests that a complainant who has consented to sexual activity with the defendant on 
a previous occasion is therefore likely to have consented at the time of the alleged sexual 
offence. This type of thinking can prove highly prejudicial for complainants, permitting 
the use of sexual experience evidence where there is no sound evidential basis for it. As a 
result of this opening provision, sexual experience evidence can no longer be introduced 
merely on the basis of this type of “she consented before, she must have consented then” 
reasoning. Of course, this is not to suggest that evidence of sexual experience evidence 
can never be introduced in order to support the defendant’s assertion that the 
complainant consented. What is prohibited is using sexual experience evidence to 
support illegitimate inferences about consent. Where there is a logical and 
demonstrated nexus between the sexual experience evidence and the impugned sexual 
encounter, it will be admissible in order to support the defendant’s contention that the 
complainant consented. For example, where the defendant had consensual sexual 
activity with the complainant in precisely the same circumstances on a previous 
occasion, this may be admissible in limited circumstances as a form of “pattern evidence” 
                                                                                                                                                 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 335; D. Stuart, “The Pendulum Has Been Pushed Too Far” 
(1993) 42 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 349. 
60 In Seaboyer, the case which preceded the introduction of s. 276, McLachlin J. referred to the traditional 
inappropriate uses of sexual experience evidence as the “twin myths”: 
 
[e]vidence that the complainant had relations with the accused and others was routinely 
presented (and accepted by judges and juries) as tending to make it more likely that the 
complainant had consented to the alleged assault and as undermining her credibility generally. 
These inferences were based not on facts, but on myths that unchaste women were more likely to 
consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of belief. These twin myths are now 
discredited. 
   
Seaboyer, supra note 50 at 604.  
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indicating her propensity to consent to sexual activity in these circumstances.61 
However, a strong link between the evidence and the alleged non-consensual encounter 
would be necessary to justify admission of the evidence. 
 
 The second myth which is dealt with in this opening provision is that which 
suggests that a woman who is sexually experienced is of low moral worth and therefore 
less credible as a witness. This stereotypical reasoning has no place in a modern sexual 
offence trial.  However, as with the prohibition of the use of prior sexual experience to 
demonstrate consent, forbidding its use to undermine a complainant’s credibility does 
not mean that a specific instance of sexual activity could never be used in order to 
challenge a complainant’s version of events. For example, a previous sexual experience 
with the defendant or another individual might be admissible because it suggests a 
motivation to fabricate on the part of the complainant.62 Thus, what is prohibited in the 
second part of section 276(1) is seeking to suggest that a sexually experienced woman 
is, as a result of her “unchaste” character, prone to mendacity. The use of genuinely 
relevant sexual experience evidence which may raise reasonable doubts about the 
complainant’s credibility is still permitted. 
 
 The inclusion of the blanket prohibition in section 276(1) sends a strong 
message about the appropriate use of sexual experience evidence. Paciocco and Stuesser 
comment that the “twin myths” inferences are pejoratively judgmental and premised on 
a simplistic and anachronistic world-view.63  Thus, section 276 opens with a necessary 
and worthwhile statement of intent on the part of the legislature. It makes it clear that 
sexual experience evidence will only be admitted where it is genuinely relevant to an 
issue in the trial and that it cannot be used merely to prejudice the complainant’s 
account. In this way it provides a strong introduction to the regime. 
 
                                                 
61 Of course, this type of argument would have to be carefully assessed by the trial judge in order to 
ensure that the evidence is genuinely relevant and that the similarities between the impugned sexual 
encounter and the evidence which it is proposed to introduce go beyond mere coincidence. 
62 An example of this would be where the defendant terminated a sexual relationship with the 
complainant in circumstances where the complainant might be motivated to fabricate an allegation of 
sexual abuse in a bid to exact revenge on the defendant. 
63 D.M. Paciocco & L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence: Revised Fifth Edition (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2008) 
at 96 [hereinafter Paciocco & Stuesser]. 
84  Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 4(1) 
B. The Criteria for Admissibility: Guiding Judicial Discretion 
 
 The “twin myths” prohibition is followed by the criteria which must be satisfied 
if sexual experience evidence is to be properly admitted. Section 276(2) provides that a 
trial judge may not admit evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity 
other than the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, whether with 
the defendant or with any other person, unless the trial judge determines that the 
evidence: 
 
(a) is of specific instances of sexual activity; 
(b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and 
(c) has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.64  
 
The effect of section 276(2) is to create a three-stage cumulative test65 for the admission 
of sexual experience evidence. The first stage in the test is that the evidence must relate 
to a specific instance of sexual activity. Thus, evidence of general sexual reputation is 
inadmissible.66 This ensures that the defence cannot engage in a fishing expedition in 
order to try to find something in the complainant’s sexual past which might serve to 
discredit her. It will be necessary to point to a particular experience of the complainant. 
Presumably this would entail identification of a general time and/or place for this sexual 
activity. Certainly, it would be necessary to identify the complainant’s partner in this 
activity.  
 
 The second stage in the test is to demonstrate that the instance of sexual activity 
is relevant to an issue at trial. The sexual activity will be relevant if it “has the capacity 
to make the determination of any fact in issue more probable than not.”67 Thus, in a case 
where consent is in issue, an instance of sexual activity would be admissible if it would 
be relevant to determining whether or not consent was present. For example, it may 
                                                 
64 The Canadian Criminal Code, s. 276(2). 
65 This phrase is coined by Duff commenting on the Scottish equivalent of this test: P. Duff, “The Scottish 
‘Rape Shield’: As good as it gets?” (2011) Edinburgh Law Review 218 at 228. 
66 See Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 63 at 95. As will be seen below, s. 277 also provides an express 
prohibition on the use of evidence of sexual reputation. 
67 S.M. Chapman, “Section 276 of the Criminal Code and the Admissibility of ‘Sexual Activity’ Evidence” 
(1999-2000) 25 Queen’s Law Journal 121 at 149 [hereinafter Chapman]. 
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demonstrate that the complainant and defendant have always had sex on precisely the 
same terms and it has always been consensual, thereby making it significantly more 
probable that consent was present at the time of the impugned encounter.  
 
 The final stage in the test requires the trial judge to make sure that the evidence 
which it is proposed to introduce has “significant probative value” which is not 
“substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of 
justice.” In order to be “significant”, the evidence must “not be so trifling as to be 
incapable, in the context of all the evidence, of raising a reasonable doubt.”68 Chapman 
suggests that the requirement of significant probative value requires only evidence 
which is, together with other evidence, capable of enabling a reasonable jury properly 
instructed to have a reasonable doubt about guilt.69 However, this evidence may still be 
excluded if its significant probative value is outweighed by its potential to prejudice the 
proper administration of justice. Paciocco and Stuesser note that on its face, this 
provision contemplates that evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt could be 
denied to a defendant. However, although this is a “troubling proposition”, Paciocco and 
Stuesser suggest that, “in practice, it is difficult to conceive of cases where a judge could 
find that prejudice to the administration of justice would substantially outweigh the 
importance of giving the accused access to evidence having such importance.”70  
 
 The test for admissibility set out in section 276(2) makes sure that decisions 
about the admissibility of sexual experience evidence cannot be made lightly. Although 
this model allows trial judges to retain their discretion, the three-stage test prevents 
trial judges from making ill-considered or hasty judgments about admissibility. Under 
this framework, the likelihood of introducing sexual experience evidence unnecessarily 
so as to prejudice the complainant’s account is significantly curtailed. However, at the 
same time, there is enough flexibility to allow the defence to admit evidence which can 
legitimately raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. 
 
                                                 
68 See Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 63 at 97, quoting R. v. Darrach [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 at para. 41 
[hereinafter Darrach]. 
69 See Chapman, supra note 67 at128. 
70 See Pacciocco & Stuesser, supra note 63 at 97. 
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 The three-stage test for admissibility is followed by a list of factors which the 
trial judge must take into account when deciding whether to admit the evidence of the 
complainant’s sexual experience: 
 
(a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer 
and defence; 
(b) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences; 
(c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at 
a just determination in the case; 
(d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or 
bias; 
(e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy 
or hostility in the jury; 
(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of 
privacy; 
(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to 
the full protection and benefit of the law; 
(h) any other factor  that the judge, provincial court or justice considers relevant.71  
 
This checklist provision attempts to further steer judicial discretion by directing judges 
to consider the interests of the defendant, the complainant and society more generally. 
Thus, in considering issues such as “relevance” or “probative value” as set out in the 
criteria for admissibility, the trial judge is obliged to take a holistic approach and keep 
all of these considerations in mind. This guarantees that all interested parties are 
adequately accommodated. Gotell comments that this check-list was “clearly intended to 
compel judges to engage in a complex balancing exercise that extends beyond the 
narrow contest between the privacy of the individual complainant and the legal rights 
claims of individual defendants.”72  This check-list contemplates “a contextual analysis” 
of sexual experience, that is, “an analysis in which the individual rights of complainants 
and defendants are set against a backdrop of sexual violence as a serious social problem 
and framed by a recognition of the need to curtail the circulation of discriminatory 
myths within sexual assault trials.”73 
 
                                                 
71 The Canadian Criminal Code, s. 276(3). 
72 L. Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History Evidence and 
the Disclosure of Personal Records” (2005-2006) 43 Alberta Law Review 743 at 755 [hereinafter Gotell]. 
73 Ibid. 
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 The test for admissibility in section 276 is also supported by section 277 which 
sets out a prohibition on the use of sexual reputation evidence. The provision provides 
that “evidence of sexual reputation, whether general or specific, is not admissible for the 
purpose of challenging or supporting the credibility of the complainant.” This provision 
prohibits the introduction of character evidence relating to sexual matters in order to 
besmirch the complainant. Setting this prohibition outside of section 276 makes it clear 
that such evidence must never be admitted in a trial and there can be no circumstances 
in which a trial judge could exercise his/her discretion in order to allow for it to be 
introduced. Given the highly prejudicial and utterly unnecessary nature of such 
evidence, this is an important and worthwhile provision. 
 
C. Assessing Section 276: The Benefits of Structured Discretion 
 
 Section 276 provides a clear and concise approach to the regulation of the use of 
sexual experience evidence. The strong blanket prohibition on reliance on the “twin 
myths” and the use of sexual reputation evidence, together with the strict admissibility 
criteria ensure that judicial discretion will be sufficiently structured so as to minimise to 
the greatest degree possible the potential to prejudice complainant’s testimony. 
However, the fact that discretion is retained has allowed for a far less complex scheme 
than section 41 of the Y.J.C.E.A. 1999 because it is not necessary to seek to foresee 
every instance where sexual experience evidence may need to be admitted. Thus, the 
need for the creation of complicated gateways is avoided.  
 
 In addition, the retention of discretion means that the restriction on the use of 
sexual experience evidence is achieved without any threat to the rights of defendants. 
Since trial judges retain their discretion to introduce this evidence, it is possible to do 
this whenever this is necessary in order to respect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
Indeed, section 276 has proved itself capable of withstanding challenges regarding its 
compatibility with defendants’ rights. In Darrach the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
section 276 did not contravene the rights of defendants which are enshrined in sections 
7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that is, the right to make 
full answer and defence and the right to a fair trial. This outcome of this challenge is 
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important as it indicates how Irish trial judges might assess a similar provision under 
the Irish constitutional guarantees of defendants’ rights.  The defendant in that case had 
argued that the exclusionary rule in section 276(1) was a blanket exclusion that 
prevented him from adducing evidence necessary to allow him to defend himself. The 
Supreme Court held that the defendant was mistaken in his characterisation of the rule 
and stated that: “... far from being a blanket exclusion, section 276(1) only prohibits the 
use of evidence of past sexual activity when it is offered to support two specific 
illegitimate inferences. These are known as the ‘twin myths’.”74 
 
 The Supreme Court went on to point out that outside of the twin myths, 
relevant evidence of sexual activity would still be admissible: 
 
[t]he phrase “by reason of the sexual nature of that activity” in s. 276 is a 
clarification by Parliament that it is inferences from the sexual nature of the 
activity, as opposed to inferences from other potentially relevant features of the 
activity, that are prohibited. If evidence of sexual activity is proffered for its non-
sexual features, such as to show a pattern of conduct or a prior inconsistent 
statement, it may be permitted. The phrase “by reason of the sexual nature of 
that activity” … limits the exclusion of evidence to that used to invoke the “twin 
myths”.75 
 
Since the defendant was still able to access relevant information, the defendant’s right to 
defend himself was not contravened and thus, section 276 was not a violation of his 
Charter rights. This assessment of section 276 provides a persuasive precedent for the 
constitutionality of a structured discretion scheme in an Irish context.  
 
 Of course, as with all legislative provisions, there are indications that section 276 
is not an infallible solution to the problems posed by the regulation of the admissibility 
of sexual experience evidence. Gotell has suggested that trial judges’ assessments of 
applications under section 276 are not sufficiently balanced and that trial judges are not 
paying enough attention to the check-list of factors which they are required to take into 
account when determining relevance. Drawing on her assessment of available 
                                                 
74 Darrach, supra note 68 at para. 32. 
75 Ibid. at para. 35. 
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judgments,76 Gotell concludes that trial judges have tended to avoid the complex 
balancing of individual and social concerns that the check-list envisions.77 Even though 
section 276 asks judges to weigh defendants’ legal rights against the privacy rights of 
complainants and to consider such factors as discriminatory beliefs and society’s interest 
in police reporting, it appears that rarely are concerns other than privacy and legal 
rights acknowledged or analysed.78 This suggests that the check-list is not achieving its 
intended goal of ensuring a thorough contextual analysis of the relevance of sexual 
experience evidence. As a result of the strength due process guarantees, defendants’ fair 
trial rights will generally be viewed as outweighing complainants’ rights to privacy.  
Consequently, a “zero sum” analysis79 of the respective rights of defendants and 
complainants in relation to the admission of sexual experience evidence will be likely to 
result in a decision to admit such evidence. In this way, the potential benefits of the 
structured discretion regime which is offered in section 276 will be negatived. 
Contrarily, if the thorough contextual analysis which is encouraged by the check-list in 
section 276 were properly undertaken, the trial judge would consider other factors (e.g. 
the need to increase reporting). This would lead to more nuanced assessments and 
strengthen the case for exclusion of such evidence.  
 
 Another criticism which Gotell has made of the current operation of section 276 
is that trial judges are not providing reasoned judgments regarding their decisions on 
admissibility. Rather than setting out how the provisions of section 276 have been 
applied, judges simply review the facts of the case, summarise defence submissions, 
recite the provisions themselves and then render a decision without showing their actual 
reasoning.80 This culture of permitting trial judges to not fully articulate their 
reasoning facilitates the improper application of the check-list of factors alluded to in the 
previous paragraph.  If trial judges do not have to show in their judgments that each 
factor was given due consideration, then there is little incentive for trial judges to 
                                                 
76 Gotell examined twenty-two lower court decisions concerning the admissibility of sexual experience 
evidence in the three-year period following the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Darrach, ibid., 
where it was decided  to uphold the constitutionality of the current formulation of s. 276: see Gotell, supra 
note 72 at 757.  
77 Gotell, ibid. at 758.  
78 Ibid. at 766. 
79 Ibid. at 767. 
80 Ibid. at 766.  
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demonstrate that they have appropriately engaged in the more nuanced assessment of 
relevance which is required by section 276. Trial judges may thus be inclined to rely on 
their traditional, and problematic, approach of simply pitting the rights of the 
complainant against those of the defendant. As stated above, this is a competition where 
the complainant is likely to lose out and the evidence will be admitted.  
 
 The problems identified by Gotell are regrettable. However, they are not 
insurmountable and could be avoided by the use of extra-legal measures which would 
support the legislative scheme and ensure that it is correctly implemented in practice. 
The first initiative which could off-set the problem of incorrect implementation of 
section 276 by trial judges is the imposition a positive requirement to produce a written 
reasoned decision regarding admissibility. This would encourage trial judges to engage 
in a thorough analysis of all the relevant factors because an omission to consider factors 
such as the need to increase reporting or the societal interest in apprehending sexual 
offenders would be immediately apparent. The requirement of a written decision would 
thus force trial judges to make sure that they consider all the relevant factors and apply 
the legislative provisions carefully. The correct application of the section by trial judges 
could be further encouraged by the provision of judicial training which shows trial 
judges how to properly weigh up all of the relevant considerations when making a 
decision about allowing the introduction of sexual experience evidence. This training 
could be supplemented by bench book guidance which trial judges could refer to during 
the trial. Such guidance would remind judges that all of the issues on the check-list must 
be taken into account when reaching their decision in this area and that it is not enough 
to simply weigh the complainant’s privacy rights against the right of the defendant to 
defend himself. It could also direct trial judges on the preparation of written decisions 
about admissibility.  
 
 Suitably supported by appropriate extra-legal measures such as these, a 
structured discretion regime appears to offer a suitable advancement upon wholly 
discretionary schemes like section 3 of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981. Much-needed 
certainty is injected into this area of the law and complainants are offered far greater 
protection from the unwarranted introduction of sexual experience evidence. 
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Importantly all of this is achieved without compromising defendants’ rights or 
introducing undue complexity into the law, two problems which are attendant upon the 
introduction of a rule-bound scheme such as section 41 of the Y.J.C.E.A. 1999. 
Consequently it would appear that structured discretion represents best practice in the 
regulation of the admissibility of sexual experience evidence.  
 
V – Conclusion 
 
 This article has described three differing approaches to the regulation of the 
admissibility of sexual experience evidence. The disadvantages of the Irish discretionary 
approach are palpable. It is clear that this model is not capable of appropriately 
protecting complainants from the unnecessary introduction of sexual experience 
evidence. However, the discussion of the English law has shown that the rule-bound 
approach might be a step too far in the opposite direction and may generate more 
problems than it solves, leading to undue complexity and raising concerns about 
defendants’ rights. On other hand, the Canadian structured discretion scheme seems to 
offer a suitable halfway between “between inflexible legislative rules and wholly 
untrammelled judicial discretion.”81 Moreover, in an Irish context, the structured 
discretion approach is far more appropriate, given the constitutional protection of 
defendants’ rights and judicial independence in criminal trials. Consequently, the section 
276 regime represents a workable best practice model for regulation of the admissibility 
of sexual experience evidence.  
  
                                                 
81 Kibble, “The Sexual History Provisions”, supra note 15 at 282.   
